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I. Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order of the Idaho Industrial Commission. Claimant asserts the 
Commission's finding that he failed to prove he was entitled to compensation for a psychological 
injury as a result of his November 13, 2005, industrial accident and injury pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-451 is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Course of Proceedings 
Claimant filed a Complaint against Employer/Surety on February 21, 2008. CR., pp. 1-2). 
The matter was tried before a referee on December 9, 2010. CR., p. 6). The sole issue for 
determination was whether and to what extent Claimant's November 13, 2005, injury includes a 
psychological condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-451. CR., pp. 6-7). On July 19, 2011, the 
referee issued written proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. CR., p. 41). The referee 
found that Claimant failed to prove he was entitled to compensation for a psychological injury as 
a result of his November 13, 2005, industrial accident and injury pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
451. CR., p. 40). Given the numerous inconsistencies in Claimant's subjective reports contained 
in his medical records, she concluded he was not a reliable historian with respect to his medical 
history. CR., p. 9). She also found the opinions of Claimant's experts less persuasive than the 
opinion of Employer's/Surety's expert because, inter alia, they lacked foundation in that they did 
not review his pre-injury medical records and relied exclusively on Claimant's subjective 
statements about his prior psychological treatment. CR., pp. 28-40). The referee found 
Employer' s/Surety' s expert opinion more credible because he was the only expert who tested 
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Claimant to determine whether he qualified for a clinical diagnosis of PTSD, and was the only 
expert who reviewed records regarding Claimant's industrial injury and pre-injury psychiatric 
condition. (R., pp. 35-40). 
The Commissioners reviewed the record and the referee's recommendations, and issued 
an order approving, confirming, and adopting her findings of fact and conclusions of law as that 
of the Commission on August 5, 2011. (R., pp. 42-43). Claimant timely filed a request for 
rehearing on August 24, 2011, which the Commission denied on September 16, 2011, on the 
ground it failed to state an argument on which the Commission could revise its conclusions. (R., 
pp. 44-45, 49-51). The Commission further stated that although Claimant disagreed with its 
conclusion, the decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. (R., 
p.51). On September 27,2011, Claimant filed a request for reconsideration of the order denying 
request for rehearing. (R., pp. 54-55). On October 26,2011, prior to the Commission issuing an 
order on the matter, Claimant filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., p. 90). Because the notice moved 
the case into the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Commission issued an order on 
November 1,2011, declining to rule on Claimant's request for reconsideration. (R., pp. 90-91). 
II. Statement of Facts 
Industrial Injury and Treatment 
On November 13, 2005, Claimant suffered a burn injury while working as a manager 
when he tripped in the kitchen and his right forearm went into a deep fryer. (R., p. 9). He 
initially presented to the Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center emergency room, and then 
transferred to the University of Utah Hospital (UUH) in Salt Lake City for further treatment. 
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(R., pp. 14-15). Claimant stayed at UUH for four days, and received both medical care and 
counseling. (R., p. 15). During that time, he was noted to have shown exaggerated pain 
behaviors and an exaggerated impression of his injury, as well as other mental issues. (R., p. 
15). At no time did he undergo skin grafts, as he reported to subsequent providers. (Def. Ex. 
18). Following discharge from UUH, Claimant stayed at a nearby hotel for another ten days in 
order to receive follow-up care. (R., p. 15). 
Claimant's condition improved and he returned to Idaho where he treated several times 
with R. Timothy Thurman, M.D., but failed to follow-through with his recommended physical 
therapy. (R., p. 17; Def. Ex. 22, p. 355). He returned to work for Employer as a kitchen 
manager five months after his accident, and was released from Dr. Thurman's care on May 17, 
2006. (R., p. 17; Cl. Depo., p. 68, L. 15-22; Def. Ex. 19, p. 335). Dr. Thurman gave Claimant a 
3% whole person impairment rating (l % for skin disfigurement and 2% for nerve disturbance) 
without permanent work restrictions. (Def. Ex. 19, p. 335). Shortly thereafter, Claimant moved 
to Massachusetts and continued to work for Employer as a manager. (Cl. Depo., pp. 83, L. 10-
19, 84, L. 21-24). He told his medical providers at the time that he transferred for a promotion, 
but stated during litigation he wanted a change of environment to "ease his extreme feelings and 
intrusive thoughts." (Tr., p. 45; Cl. Depo., p.69, L. 8-10; Cl. Post-Hearing Brief, p. 4; Def. Ex. 
24, p. 369). While in Massachusetts, his son was born with a cleft palate condition, resulting in a 
number of doctor visits and surgeries. (R., p. 10). Claimant changed jobs and worked at a sea 
food restaurant before returning to Idaho to work at Ruby River Steakhouse. (Tr., pp. 46-47). 
Claimant testified at hearing that he left that job and two subsequent jobs because of his inability 
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to trust his coworkers. (R., p. 10; Tr., pp. 49-50, 58-59). At his deposition, however, Claimant 
testified that he left Ruby River because he disagreed with the way it was operated, and left a job 
at Cartridge World because his manager was "a prick." (Mazzone Depo., pp. 91, 97, L. 20-25). 
In October 2007, Claimant presented to the Department of Health and Welfare Regional 
Behavioral Health Services (Behavioral Health) for what he described as PTSD symptoms as a 
result of his 2005 burn injury. (R., p. 21; Def. Ex. 30, p. 412). He reported nightmares, crying 
spells, anxiety, flashbacks, intrusive memories, sleep problems, depression, and hypersensitivity. 
(R., p. 21; Def. Ex. 30, p. 412-13). He also reported only one other major depressive episode, 
which was after the death of his daughter five years prior, when he was hospitalized for one 
week and prescribed antidepressants. (R., p. 21; Def. Ex. 30, p. 412). With respect to his burn 
injury, Claimant inaccurately told providers he had skin grafts and was in the hospital for 
"several months." (Def. Ex. 30, pp. 412, 420, 430-440). 
Claimant received prescription medications and counseling at Behavioral Health several 
more times in October. (Def. Ex., 30 pp. 420-27). His visits then became monthly, with some 
periods of no treatment, through January 2009. (Def. Ex. 30, pp. 428-449). Chad Murdock, 
M.D., was responsible for managing Claimant's symptoms with medications. (Murdock Depo., 
p. 6, L. 11-12). At his deposition, Dr. Murdock testified that his knowledge of Claimant's 
psychological history came exclusively from what Claimant told him and the initial intake report 
prepared by a social worker. (Murdock Depo., p. 7, L. 18-25). Dr. Murdock did not review any 
of Claimant prior medical records, including those from three days before his burn injury 
describing significant psychological stressors and symptoms. (R., pp. 28-29; Def. Ex. 30, pp. 
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275-76; Murdock Depo., p. 7, L. 18-25). Though he documented Claimant's nightmares, he did 
not record their subject matter. (Murdock Depo., p. 16, L. 2-6). Dr. Murdock diagnosed 
Claimant with PTSD, severe major depression, and possible dissociative disorder. (Murdock 
Depo., p. 10, L. 6-11). He testified that the predominant, primary cause of Claimant's PTSD was 
his industrial accident and treatment. (Murdock Depo., pp. 20, L. 15-16, 23). 
In May 2008, Claimant received in-patient treatment from Mary Beth Ostrom, M.D., at 
the Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center Behavioral Health Center. (Ostrom Depo., p. 5, L. 
13-20). Dr. Ostrom testified that she treated Claimant again in 2010 when he received inpatient 
care, and several times after that as an outpatient. (Ostrom Depo., pp. 5, L. 13-20, 8 L. 4-5, 18-
20). Records of Dr. Ostrom's treatment are not in the record. (R., p. 33). Dr. Ostrom testified 
that she only saw "some" of Claimant's records from Region VII Mental Health Center and 
outpatient treatment with Dr. Murdock. (Ostrom Depo., p. 9, L. 5-6). Similar to Dr. Murdock, 
she did not review or have independent knowledge of Claimant's earlier psychological treatment, 
including treatment he received immediately prior to the 2005 accident. (R., p. 34; Ostrom 
Depo., p. 9, L. 9-14). Based on Claimant's reported history, Dr. Ostrom opined he has chronic 
PTSD as a result of his 2005 burn injury and bipolar disorder type I. (Dr. Ostrom Depo., pp. 10, 
L. 19-21, 12, L. 16-19; Cl. Ex. H, p. 250). She explained, however, that she could not state with 
certainty whether his burn accident and injury are the predominant cause of his PTSD given his 
multiple other psychiatric issues. (R., p. 34; Dr. Ostrom Depo., p. 22, L. 13-20). 
In February 2008 and July 2009 (and very briefly in May 2009), Michael Enright, Ph.D., 
evaluated Claimant at Employer's/Surety's request and performed a number of psychological 
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tests. (Def. Ex. 32). Dr. Enright testified that his knowledge of Claimant's history came from 
Claimant himself, through personal interviews and reading the hearing transcript in this matter, 
and a "voluminous amount" of psychiatric and general medical records, including records before 
and after Claimant's 2005 bum accident. (R., p.36; Def. Ex. 32, pp. 455-57, 470, 475-76; 
Enright Depo., pp. 7, L. 13-25, 8, L 1-7). Dr. Enright also testified about the American 
Psychiatric Association's diagnostic and statistics manual and its criteria for establishing PTSD. 
(Enright Depo., pp. 11-17, 26-29). He also discussed the various types of medications Claimant 
took prior to and at the time of his industrial accident, and the conditions/symptoms they treat, 
including bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and sleep disturbances. (Enright Depo., pp. 57, 
L. 15-16, 62-65, 68, 73, 74, 140, L. 10-16). During one of his examinations of Claimant, Dr. 
Enright administered the Clinical Administered PTSD Scale and determined Claimant does not 
meet the criteria for a clinical diagnosis of PTSD, has somatization tendencies, multiple life 
stressors, a longstanding psychiatric disorder, and unmet dependency needs that account for the 
symptoms he (Claimant) attributes to his industrial injury. (R., pp. 35-36; Enright Depo., pp. 56, 
L. 3-7, 58, L. 2-8; Def. Ex. 32, pp. 464-68). Dr. Enright's reports document multiple examples 
of Claimant's inconsistent reports of his medical and psychiatric history. (R., p.36; Def. Ex. 32, 
pp. 452-68; Enright Depo., pp. 54-60). 
Pre-Injury Psychiatric and Medical Treatment 
Prior to Claimant's 2005 industrial accident, he received treatment for debilitating 
anxiety, PTSD, bipolar disorder, depression, sleep disturbances, extreme mood fluctuations, trust 
issues, and various other psychological problems. (R., pp. 9, 11-14). Just three days before his 
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2005 industrial injury, Claimant underwent a psychiatric evaluation and reported severe manic 
symptoms, including sleep deprivation for two weeks, difficulty concentrating, and feelings of 
being overwhelmed. (R., pp. 8-9). Relevant psychiatric and medical history includes the 
following: 
1994/1995 (age 18 or 19) - Admitted as an inpatient for psychiatric treatment 
following a break up. (Def. Ex. 7, p. 184). 
- 9126/2002 (Phoenix, AZ, age 26) - Admitted for four days to Thunderbird 
Medical Center's Adult Behavioral Health Unit for depressive disorder. 
Admission notes state: "26 y.o. male admitted to unit due to self-reports of 
increasing depression, anxiety, that pt describes as debilitating enough to affect 
his ability to function .... Reports poor sleep, poor appetite, labile mood." (Def. 
Ex. 7, pp. 173-77). Current medications included Zyprexa, Restoril, Zoloft, and 
Topomax. Claimant reported that he smoked marijuana ten days prior to 
admission and that his longest period of sobriety was two years (between ages 18 
and 20). (Def. Ex. 7, p. 180). On a scale of one to ten, Claimant rated his anxiety 
and depression a ten. (Def. Ex. 7, p. 188). 
Notes from a therapy session state Claimant "expressed depression 
surrounding his work environment and frustrations at being a supervisor, 
boss/wanting to be liked . ... " (Def. Ex. 7, p. 190) (emphasis added). Upon 
discharge, his physician identified the following problems to be treated: "Mood 
disturbances as evidenced by increasing feelings of helplessness/hopelessness, 
difficulty concentrating, increased sadness, increased anxiety, and distorted 
thinking." (Def. Ex. 7, p. 197) (emphasis added). 
- 1/11/2003 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 26) - Records from Eastern Idaho Regional 
Medical Center state: "The patient has a history of bipolar disorder and post 
traumatic stress disorder. He has recently moved to the area within the last five 
days. Interestingly, he has been on three different psychotropic medications 
in recent months, Zyprexa, Zoloft, and Gabitril. He ran out of those medications 
five days ago." (Def. Ex. 6, p. 107) (emphasis added). 
- 6/23/2003 (Twin Falls, ID, age 26) - Emergency room visit for a headache lasting 
four days. Reported associated nausea, vomiting, and neck pain. Records list 
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tension headaches and bipolar affective disorder under "Past Medical History." 
(Def. Ex. 9, pp. 203-205) (emphasis added). 
- 2117/2004 (Fort Collins, CO, age 27) - Records from Dr. Caitlin Ahem state: 
"MOOD Swings was seen and treated [by a] psychiatrist in the past and did well 
on Zyprexa and Zoloft. He went off because he did not have ins[ urance] and 
would like to go back on. SLEEP Disturbance occ[ asionally] will not sleep or 
eat for days." Dr. Ahem diagnosed Claimant with manic depression. (Def. Ex. 
12, p. 224) (emphasis added). 
- 4/23/2004 (Cheyenne, WY, age 27) - Records from HealthReach Acute Care 
state: "Comes in today, difficulties with his bipolar. He has been on Zyprexa and 
Zoloft. That has worked well for him for a couple of years now. He has not had 
any manic episodes however the past five days he has been having difficulties." 
Diagnosis: Bipolar with insomnia. Hand-written notes state that Ambien has 
not helped in the past; Claimant just needs to sleep; two years ago today his 
daughter died; his five-year-old son had palate surgery, and; he was currently off 
work. (Def. Ex. 10, p. 219) (emphasis added). 
- 4/26/2004 (Fort Collins, CO, age 27) - Records from Dr. Harris Jensen state: 
"Patient with a history of bipolar disorder presents with complaints of more 
mania [and) depression symptoms breaking through such that he hasn't been 
able to work for several days. Daughter died 5/3102 - Matthew [diagnosed with 
bipolar affective disorder.] Son born with cleft lip [and] palate - [third] 
surgery next month - travel to [Utah] for those[.] [Five] days ago - mood swings 
worse. Out of work (took days off work as [manager] of Texas Roadhouse). 
Depressed. Poor sleep - [three to four] hourslnight, tired in day. Tired. 
Lethargic. Yet also manic. Thoughts are racing fast - on multiple levels - at 
some time thinks sporadically - 'we're in debt - let's buy another vehicle - we 
have a [ten] month old in [the] house.' High energy too - cleaned house from top 
to bottom [until] 2am last night. He notes manic episodes have occurred for hours 
to [one to two] weeks, marked by irritable mood, mildly euphoric, high energy, 
pressure to stay busy, racing thoughts, rapid speech, more social, poor impulse 
control (recently drove [six] hours, spent money on a friend, now can't afford rent 
bill). Manic episodes began about 5/02." (Def. Ex. 13, pp. 236-37) (emphasis 
added). 
Notes also show that Claimant denied abuse or dependence on alcohol or 
street drugs. Dr. Jensen diagnosed him with rapid cycling bipolar affective 
disorder, cycling one to five times per day. (Def. Ex. 13, pp. 238-39). 
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- 4/26/2004 (Fort Collins, CO, age 27) - Dr. Caitlin Ahem records: "Patient is a 27 
year old male with [history of! Bipolar saw Dr. Jensen today added Depokote 
500mg QAM, he is not sleeping even with the Zyprexa and has been having 
[headaches], he has old Ambien at home which has helped a little." Claimant 
received a prescription for Ambien. (Def. Ex. 12, p. 229). 
- 7/2112004 (Fort Collins, CO, age 27) - Dr. Caitlin Ahem records: "Patient is a 27 
year old male. HEADACHE - worse at night. DEPRESSION improved on 
medicine. MOOD Swings improved on medicine. SLEEP Disturbance. STRESS 
at work." Dr. Ahern diagnosed Claimant with manic depression. (Def. Ex. 
12, p. 234) (emphasis added). 
- 9/8/2004 (Cheyenne, WY, age 28) - Emergency room records note Claimant 
passed out at home and was unconscious for several minutes. (Def. Ex. 14, p. 
255). 
- 10128/2004 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 28) - Records from Dr. Tony Roisum state 
Claimant presented with severe headaches and nausea, and his medications 
were not helping. He had a constant headache for the past week. Claimant 
was prescribed Stadol and Phenergan, and instructed to continue using Midrin and 
Vicodin. (Def. Ex. 16, p. 266) (emphasis added). 
- 4/6/2005 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 28) - Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center 
emergency room report: "The patient has a long history of headaches, but has 
increasing difficulty in recent weeks .... A week ago, he had some fairly classic 
visual scotomata .... The patient did suffer a head injury in 1998, had a CT scan 
at the time .... He has also been prescribed Hydrocodone by an outpatient clinic 
today but that has not been particularly useful." (Def. Ex. 6, p. 110) (emphasis 
added). 
- 4/8/2005 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 28) - Records from Dr. Tony Roisum: "Patient 
presents with a headache, nausea, vomiting, fatigue and also difficulties with 
headache and generally, the patient is just not feeling well and he thinks it is 
because he has been off of the Zyprexa and he thinks maybe some of the 
stresses are getting to him." Diagnosed with fatigue, insomnia, headache, 
nausealvomiting, and visual changes. (Def. Ex. 16, p. 269) (emphasis added). 
- 11110/2005 (Idaho Falls, ID, age 29) - Three days before Claimant's industrial 
accident. Psychiatric evaluation with Darin Leslie, PA-C. Notes state: "29-year 
old male who complains of manic symptoms including sleep deprivation, 
difficulty concentration, feeling overwhelmed with life and current situation. 
Describes significant psychological stressors including 2-year old son who is 
9 
currently hospitalized with unknown illness. Son also has a cleft lip and palate, 
has gone through [nine] surgeries so far. Also describes a very high stress job as 
a restaurant manager, working 70 hours/week with one day off. In the last two 
weeks has . . . very little to no sleep whatsoever. Having difficulty thinking, 
seeing things out of the corners of his eyes that aren't there. Went to 
Emergency Department three days ago, was given Ambien for sleep, which was 
not helpful. Has had recurrent suicidal ideation, but not plans and not 
intention. Describes similar episode approximately [five] years ago following 
stillbirth of first child. Was hospitalized for [four] days. Continued on 
medication for [two] years. Describes recent symptoms as worse than first 
episode. Also notes that he has lost 18lbs in last [three] weeks." Current 
medications were noted as Lithium, Clonazepam, and Zoloft. Mr. Leslie 
prescribed Zyprexa and increased the dosage of Lithium. (Def. Ex. 17, pp. 275-
76) (emphasis added). 
At the time of hearing in December 2010, Claimant was 34 years of age and 
residing in Idaho Falls. (R., p. 4). 
III. Standard of Review 
Findings of fact made by the Idaho Industrial Commission are subject to limited appellate 
review. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9; I.C. § 72-732. The reviewing court's function is to determine 
whether the findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Const. Art. V, 
§ 9; I.C. § 72-732(1). Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Neihart v. Universal Joint Auto Parts, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 801, 803, 118 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) (quoting Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho 
State Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996)). It is more than a scintilla of 
proof, but less than a preponderance. Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 
211,217 (2000). All facts and inferences will be viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
who prevailed before the Industrial Commission, and the Commission's conclusions regarding 
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credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the conclusions are clearly 
erroneous. Neihart, 141 Idaho at 802-03, 118 P.3d at 134-35. 
IV. Issues Presented on Appeal 
A. Is the Commission's finding that Claimant's November 13,2005, industrial injury does not 
include a psychological condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-451 supported by substantial 
and competent evidence? 
B. Did the Commission err by quoting the American Psychiatric Association's DSM-IV-TR® 
and considering Claimant's prescription history? 
C. Is Claimant entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804? 
D. Are Employer and Surety entitled attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2? 
V. Argument 
A. THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT CLAIMANT'S NOVEMBER 13, 2005, 
INDUSTRIAL INJURY DOES NOT INCLUDE A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CONDITION PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 72-451 IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE CLAIMANT IS 
NOT A RELIABLE HISTORIAN WITH RESPECT TO HIS MEDICAL 
HISTORY AND THE OPINION OF DR. ENRIGHT IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN 
THE OPINIONS OF DRS. MURDOCK AND OSTROM. 
There are different legal standards in Idaho for physical and psychological injuries. For 
physical injuries, a worker must establish a probable, not merely possible, connection to the 
cause and effect to prove compensability. Vernon v. Omark Indus., 113 Idaho 358, 360, 744 
P.2d 86, 88 (1987). In contrast, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-451, psychological injuries are 
compensable only when the following conditions are met: 
11 
1. The injury was caused by an accident and physical injury or occupational 
disease or psychological mishap accompanied by resultant physical injury; 
2. The injury did not arise from conditions generally inherent in every working 
situation or from a personnel related action; 
3. Such accident and injury must be the predominant cause as compared to 
all other causes combined of any consequence; 
4. The causes or injuries must exist in a real and objective sense; 
5. The condition must be one which constitutes a diagnosis under the American 
Psychiatric Association's most recent diagnostic and statistics manual, 
and must be diagnosed by a psychologist or psychiatrist licensed in the 
jurisdiction in which treatment is rendered; 
6. There is clear and convincing evidence that the injury arose out of and in the 
course of the employment from the accident or occupational disease. 
I.C. § 72-451 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, rigorous causation standards apply when a worker alleges a psychological 
injury. Smith v. Garland Construction Servs., 2009 lIC 0179 (June 8, 2009). "Clear and 
convincing" means a degree of proof greater than a mere preponderance. In the Matter of 
Gordon W Jenkins, 120 Idaho 379, 383, 816 P.2d 335, 339 (1991). It is generally understood to 
be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. In re 
Doe, 244 P.3d 190, 193,2010 Ida. LEXTS 198,6-7 (2010); In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 
P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Essentially, when there is conflicting evidence throughout the 
proceedings, the standard cannot be met because clear and convincing evidence is evidence that 
is free from confusion, fully intelligible, distinct, and which establishes that the truth of the 
asserted fact is highly probable. Shields v. Villareal, 33 P.3d 1032, 1036 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). 
The Industrial Commission has stated that Idaho Code § 72-451(3) doest not present a 
"but for" standard of causation. Smith, 2009 lIC 0179. It explained: 
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Id. 
Under the predominant cause standard, it is not sufficient that the 
industrial injury be merely the proverbial "straw that breaks the 
camel's back." Although an employer takes an employee as he is, 
in determining the predominant cause of a psychological condition, 
the contribution of all of the employee's pre-accident factors must 
be weighed against the contribution of the industrial accident. To 
be the predominant cause, the work injury must be a greater cause 
of the psychological condition than all other causes combined. 
Thus, if a percentage of contribution were assigned to each and 
every factor which collectively produce a claimant's psychological 
condition, the contribution of the industrial accident must be more 
than 50% of the total of all of the causes. Against this standard, the 
evidence, including expert testimony, produced by the parties must 
be evaluated. 
In our case, Claimant asserts he provided compelling, competent, and substantial proof 
regarding each element of Idaho Code § 72-451, but the standard is clear and convincing 
evidence, and the Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of the worker 
when evidence is conflicting. Bennett v. Bunker Hill Co., 88 Idaho 300, 305, 399 P.2d 270, 272 
(1965). The evidence regarding Claimant's pre-accident psychological treatment is significant, 
including treatment and medication for bipolar disorder, anxiety, and depression. Nonetheless, 
following his industrial injury, Claimant repeatedly told medical providers his only prior 
psychological treatment was for an acute incident of depression following the stillbirth of his 
daughter. Medical records show that following his bum injury, he consistently exaggerated the 
nature of his injury and minimized the extent of his prior psychological conditions. Accordingly, 
the Commission concluded Claimant is not a reliable historian with respect to his medical 
history, and where his testimony differed from the information contained in his medical records, 
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it gave the infonnation in the medical records more weight. Affording certain evidence more 
weight is well within the Commission's discretion and its findings are supported by the evidence. 
Claimant also asserts the opinions of Drs. Murdock and Ostrom support his position. 
However, as stated above, the weight to be given to testimony, the credibility of the witnesses, 
and the reasonable conclusions and inferences to be derived from the record are peculiarly within 
the province of the Industrial Commission. !d. On appeal, Claimant is simply asking the court 
to reweigh the testimony and credibility of his witnesses. The Commission determined his 
experts failed to render adequate evidence to support his prima facie case of proving a 
psychological injury under Idaho Code § 72-451. Specifically, the Commission found that Drs. 
Murdock and Ostrom lacked foundation because neither reviewed medical records related to his 
bum injury or pre-injury psychological treatment. Their opinions regarding any change in 
Claimant's psychological condition following his industrial accident were thus deemed to lack 
credibility. The Commission also found the doctors' testimony failed to establish a DSM-IV-
TR® diagnosis of PTSD. Dr. Murdock failed to confirm symptoms sufficient to establish a 
diagnosis, and failed to rule out malingering or other psychological conditions, such as bipolar 
disorder. Moreover, there is no evidence Dr. Ostrom confinned the DSM criteria for 
establishing PTSD in reaching her diagnosis. 
In contrast, Dr. Enright reviewed Claimant's prior medical records and records from his 
bum injury, which gave him independent knowledge of Claimant's prior psychological 
treatment. He documented specific examples of Claimant's conflicting statements upon 
evaluation and to medical providers. Additionally, Dr. Enright is the only expert who tested 
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Claimant to determine whether he qualified for a clinical diagnosis of PTSD. Dr. Enright 
concluded Claimant did not meet the criteria for PTSD, and that his November 13, 2005, 
industrial accident and injury are not the predominant factor above all other factors combined of 
his current psychological condition. 
The Commission's decision demonstrates it considered the entire record and found 
Claimant's experts less credible than Employer's/Surety's and thus gave their testimony less 
weight. Dr. Enright's testimony is competent evidence to support the Commission's finding that 
Claimant's industrial injury did not include a psychological injury pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
451. 
B. THE COMMISSION'S REFERENCE TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION'S DSM-IV-TR® WAS REASONABLE AND IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH IDAHO CODE § 72-451(5), AND ITS DISCUSSION OF CLAIMANT'S 
PRESCRIPTION HISTORY WAS WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY AS THE FINDER 
OF FACT. 
Claimant asserts the Commission erred when it quoted specific sections of the DSM-IV-
TR® regarding PTSD because the entire manual was not admitted into evidence. As set forth 
above, Idaho Code § 72-451 expressly provides that the alleged psychological condition must be 
one which constitutes a diagnosis under the American Psychiatric Association's most recent 
diagnostic and statistics manual, and must be diagnosed by a psychologist or psychiatrist 
licensed in the jurisdiction in which treatment is rendered. I.e. § 72-451(5). The plain language 
of the statute indicates that the legislature intended the Commission, as the fact-finder, to 
consider DSM criteria in any decision involving a psychological injury. Moreover, Idaho Code § 
72-714(3) provides: 
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the commission, or member thereot: or a hearing officer, referee or 
examiner, to whom the matter has been assigned, shall make such 
inquiries and investigations as may be deemed necessary. 
I.C. § 72-714(3) (emphasis added). 
In addition, the Industrial Commission is not governed by the same rules of evidence as 
courts of law. Strict adherence to the rules of evidence is not required in Industrial Commission 
proceedings, and admission of evidence in such proceedings is more relaxed. Hagler v. Micron 
Technology, 118 Idaho 596, 598-99, 798 P.2d 55, 57-58 (1990). When the legislature created the 
Commission, it intended that proceedings be as summary, economical, and simple as the rules of 
equity would allow. I.C. § 72-708; See Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 263, 441 
P.2d 172, 173 (1968); Hite v. Kulhenak Bldg. Contractor, 96 Idaho 70, 72, 524 P.2d 531, 533 
(1974). Recognized treatises and works dealing with topics in which the Commission possesses 
expertise may be admitted into evidence through witnesses to be used as substantive evidence. 
Hite, 96 Idaho at 72, 524 P.2d at 533. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5251(5), which controls the 
admission of evidence in proceedings governed by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, the 
Commission may utilize its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the 
evaluation of evidence. See Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44,49-50, 156 P.3d 545, 550-51 (2007). 
Claimant does not dispute that the DSM-IV -TR® is the American Psychiatric 
Association's most recent diagnostic and statistics manual. Although neither party offered the 
entire manual into evidence, Dr. Enright testified that it was a recognized authority regarding 
psychological conditions and discussed the primary criteria for establishing a diagnosis of PTSD. 
Claimant did not object to Dr. Enright's reference or reliance on the manual at the time of his 
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testimony, nor did he object to it in his post-hearing brief. Claimant does not allege he suffers 
from conditions other than PTSD as a result of his industrial injury, and provides no evidence for 
why the entire manual, which discusses many other psychological conditions, should be admitted 
into evidence. Further, because Idaho Code § 72-451 requires that a psychological condition be 
one which constitutes a diagnosis under the American Psychiatric Association's most recent 
diagnostic and statistics manual, it reasonably follows that the Commission may rely on the 
manual and examine any sections it deems relevant to determining whether a claimant's alleged 
psychological condition is compensable. Accordingly, the Commission's reliance on the 
American Psychiatric Association's DSM-IV-TR® was reasonable and in accordance with Idaho 
Code § 72-451(5). 
Claimant similarly contends the Commission ened by considering evidence in the record 
(Claimant's prescription history), and giving "it's[sic] own qualified medical opinion" of 
Claimant's pre-injury medical diagnosis. (Cl. Brief, p. 20). First, this assertion misconstrues the 
Commission's findings. The Commission did not diagnose Claimant's pre-injury medical 
condition; it described the medications Claimant was prescribed and the reasons they are 
commonly prescribed. Further, not only can such information be gleaned from Claimant's 
medical and prescription records in evidence, which document his symptoms and medication 
history, but Dr. Enright explained in his testimony the specific types of medications that are 
prescribed for bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and sleep disturbances. The Commission's 
consideration of Claimant's prescription medication history and its statements about certain 
medications is within its discretion as the finder of fact and not in enor. Alternatively, even if 
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the Commission's statements about Claimant's prescriptions were erroneous, the error was 
harmless. See Hagler, 118 Idaho at 599, 798 P.2d at 58. 
Claimant further alleges the Commission utilized the Internet to find a reference in the 
DSM-IV-TR®, but such allegation again misconstrues the Commission's finding and is without 
merit. The Commission stated the DSM-IV -TR® criteria are "readily available through the 
Internet and other sources" to indicate its availability to Claimant or any of his providers. (R., p. 
30). There is no evidence the Commission relied on the Internet in reaching its decision and 
Claimant cites no legal supp011 for his contention the reference was erroneous. 
Claimant also disagrees with a number of the Commission's findings of fact for a variety 
of reasons. Employer/Surety dispute Claimant's characterizations of why the findings are 
inaccurate and contend such findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence and 
not in error. 
C. CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL BECAUSE 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S DECISION HE DID NOT SUSTAIN A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
INJURY. 
Attorney fees are not granted to a claimant as a matter of right under Idaho's Worker's 
Compensation Law, but may only be affirmatively awarded under the circumstances set forth in 
Idaho Code § 72-804. Wutherich v. Terteling Co., Inc., 135 Idaho 593, 595, 21 P.3d 915, 917 
(2001); Troutner v. Traffic Control Co., 97 Idaho 525, 528, 547 P.2d 1130, 1133 (1976). Idaho 
Code § 72-804 provides: 
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Attorney's fees -- Punitive costs in certain cases. If the 
commission or any court before whom any proceedings are 
brought under this law determines that the employer or his surety 
contested a claim for compensation made by an injured employee 
or dependent of a deceased employee without reasonable ground, 
or that an employer or his surety neglected or refused within a 
reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to 
pay to the injured employee or his dependents the compensation 
provided by law, or without reasonable grounds discontinued 
payment of compensation as provided by law justly due and owing 
to the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay 
reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided 
by this law. In all such cases the fees of attorneys employed by 
injured employees or their dependents shall be fixed by the 
commlSSlOn. 
I.C. § 72-804. 
In this case, following its investigation, Employer/Surety denied Claimant's claim he 
sustained a psychological injury based on his medical records showing extensive psychological 
treatment prior to the accident and the opinion of Dr. Enright. The Commission agreed, and 
determined Claimant did not qualify for a diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-IV -TR®, that his 
November 13, 2005, industrial bum injury was not the predominant cause of his current 
psychological condition, and that he did not suffer a psychological injury arising out of and in 
the course of his employment with Employer. Given the abundance of evidence demonstrating 
Claimant's extensive pre-injury psychological treatment and Dr. Enright's findings, denial of his 
claim was reasonable and attorney fees are not warranted. 
D. EMPLOYER AND SURETY ARE ENTITLED ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT 
TO IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 11.2 BECAUSE CLAIMANT'S APPEAL IS NOT 
WELL GROUNDED IN FACT AND MERELY ASKS THE COURT TO RE-
WEIGH THE EVIDENCE. 
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Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 provides that an attorney's signature on a notice of appeal 
constitutes 
a certificate that the attorney or party has read the notice of appeal . 
. . ; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and 
belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is 
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. 
l.A.R. 11.2. 
The court has held that "[a]lthough an attorney's purpose in tiling an appeal may not 
always appear clear from the record, this Court can infer intent and purpose from the attorney's 
actions and the surrounding circumstances." Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Constr., Inc., 144 Idaho 
171, 176, 158 P.3d 947, 952 (2007) (quoting Neihart v. Universal Joint Auto Parts, Inc., 141 
Idaho 801, 803, 118 P.3d 133, 135 (2005». In Fritts, the appellants failed to provide the court 
with the necessary record, which led the court to conclude they had failed to demonstrate a basis 
for bringing the appeal and wasted judicial resources. Fritts, 144 Idaho at 176-77, 158 P.3d at 
952-53. As a sanction, the court awarded attorney fees to the respondents. Id. 
In this case, Claimant's appeal is not well grounded in fact because the facts 
overwhelmingly support the Commission's decision. Moreover, Claimant is simply asking the 
court to re-weigh the evidence and evaluate the Commission's credibility determinations, which 
is an improper basis for an appeal. Claimant provides no existing law or good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and has needlessly increased the cost of 
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litigation. For these reasons, an improper purpose can be inferred and attorney fees and costs are 
appropriate. 
VI. Conclusion 
Because the Commission's decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence 
and Claimant's appeal simply asks the court to re-weigh the facts and evaluate the Commission's 
credibility determinations, Employer/Surety respectively request the court uphold the 
Commission's decision and award attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 2012. 
Emma R. Wilson 
Attorney for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of April, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Stephen A. Meikle 
Advantage Legal Services 
P.O. Box 51137 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
EMMA R. WILSON 
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